Ideas from 'Possibility' by Michael Jubien [2009], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Possibility' by Jubien,Michael [OUP 2009,978-0-19-923278-9]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
|
13395
|
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
|
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
|
13378
|
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
|
13402
|
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
|
|
13405
|
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
|
13399
|
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
|
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
|
13398
|
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
|
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
|
13392
|
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
|
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
|
13404
|
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
|
13386
|
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
|
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
|
13403
|
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
|
13375
|
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
|
13393
|
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
|
13388
|
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
|
13384
|
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
|
|
13385
|
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
|
13383
|
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
|
|
13400
|
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
|
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
|
13401
|
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
|
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
|
13380
|
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
|
13376
|
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
|
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
|
13381
|
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
|
|
13382
|
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
|
13379
|
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
|
13394
|
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
|
13391
|
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
|
|
13374
|
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
|
13389
|
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
|
|
13390
|
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
|
13396
|
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
|
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
|
13377
|
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects
|